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17 November 1964

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

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
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Laos: High levels of Communist truck traffic continue along Route 7 connecting North Vietnam with the Plaine des Jarres.

On 14 November, a Meo roadwatch team reported a convoy of 120 trucks moving toward the Plaine. This is the largest single convoy sighted since the Communists resumed major resupply activity in late September. [Laotian Air Force attempts to interdict the road have thus far not been effective.]

Recently stepped-up Communist activity in the Tha Thom region probably reflects the improved logistical situation on the Plaine. There have been reports of substantial Communist reinforcements arriving north of Tha Thom from the Plaine area.

In Vientiane, meanwhile, continuing suspicions among the rightist elements have given rise to new coup rumors. Although there does not appear at present to be any solid foundation to these rumors, they point up the persistence of deep-seated rivalries which keep the government unstable.

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(Map)

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Guinea: President Sekou Touré's control is threatened for the first time since Guinea's independence in 1958.

Sweeping administrative measures announced by Touré last week appear to have intensified a long simmering conflict between him and powerful members of the ruling party. Changes included a cabinet and administrative shake-up, which downgraded or banished to the provinces several important personalities, and a return to full state control over domestic and foreign trade.

The crisis may come to a head on 19 November when the party's top council holds an emergency meeting. Opposition to Touré may coalesce around Finance Minister Saifoulaye Diallo, who has been number-two man in both government and party and who is a representative of the Fulani, the country's largest tribal group. In a showdown Touré probably would receive the support of the defense minister, whose security forces have been playing an increasing role lately.


The crisis arises from domestic, economic, and tribal factors rather than any discontent with Touré's increasing Western orientation. Unhappiness over inflation and corruption is widespread, and the Fulani, who were dominant before Touré came to power, also criticize alleged discrimination against their tribe.

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NOTES

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Israel: After a long intraparty struggle, Prime Minister Eshkol's control over the Mapai Party has been reaffirmed in a development unrelated to last week's border clash with Syria. His chief critic, former prime minister Ben-Gurion, resigned from the Mapai central committee on 15 November, after it approved Eshkol's proposal for an electoral alignment with a left-wing member of the governing coalition, Achdut Haavoda. Ben Gurion's disruptive activities have shaken the Mapai, however, and may in time lead to a weakening of its dominance of the coalition.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Malaysia: Anti-Malaysia demonstrations in two towns in Sarawak on 15 November probably were inspired by the Communist-controlled Sarawak Advanced Youth Association. The protests were timed to undercut the federation government's current campaign to emphasize the loyalty of all major communities to Malaysia. The association, with an estimated hard-core membership of 1,500 indigenous Chinese, undertakes subversion largely independent of Indonesia, and is regarded by the UK as a potentially serious threat to Malaysia. [REDACTED]

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The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

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The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

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The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

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The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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